context, the Commission argument was that if most Member States already applied reduced rates to the listed items, then the compulsory nature of the list would be almost irrelevant, as it did not imply any change to either their domestic legislations, or budgetary consequences. In this way the Commission sought to facilitate Council's approval of the proposal. 15 Temporary derogations, allowing Member States to apply reduced rates and zero rates, would be repealed: Article 28(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive allowed Member States to retain the use of reduced rates and zero rates in force on 31 December 1975. The measure was temporary, and destined to be repealed once fiscal frontiers were abolished and taxation within the Community was based on the principle of origin. Attempting to fulfil this objective, the Commission's proposal envisaged the revocation of Article 28(2). It considered that the extensive application of reduced rates and particularly zero-rates had the potential to obstruct the Internal Market and distort competition, thus concluding that it "could not recommend that the Community should abandon 12 Mostly if compared with the list which was ultimately approved by Council Directive 92/77/EEC and still currently in force, see Annex H to the Sixth VAT Directive. However, as the Commission significantly pointed out, these items represented approximately one third of the common Community tax base, see COM(87) 320 final, 5 August 1987, n. 11 above, at 11. 13 COM(87) 320 final, 5 August 1987, n. 11 above, at 10. 14 See COM(87) 320 final, 5 August 1987, n. 11 above, at 2. 15 As discussed infra, the tactic proved ultimately unsuccessful, as the proposal failed to get Council approval due to a great extent to the compulsory nature of the list.
products. 22 The European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial
Policy reported that, 23 as soon as the debate on the Commission's proposal was initiated in the European Parliament, it became clear that a great number of national and special interests were anxious to have the list of items, which could be subject to the reduced rate, enlarged. 24 According to that same report, some fifty amendments to the first version of the European Parliament's opinion on the proposal were tabled in the Committee.
In was against this background that the Commission realised that the Council would fail to reach agreement and accepted that a more pragmatic approach would be required. The idea of a transitional phase, which would last beyond 1 January 1993, started to take shape in late 1989.
During the period until 1991 a series of key meetings of the ECOFIN Council of Ministers took place, from which emerged the basic shape of the VAT arrangements to be applied to intra-Community trade after 1993. These were to become known as the "transitional VAT system". The decision to introduce a VAT transitional system had serious implications for the discussions on the harmonisation of VAT rates. Rates approximation was still seen as an absolute necessity if abolition of border controls was to take place, however, a close approximation such as the one put forward by the Commission in its 1987 proposal was no longer required. Moreover, as the rates approximation as per the Commission's 1987 proposal had given rise to such intensive controversy the decision to introduce a transitional system provided the perfect pretext to bring into force a less extreme approximation. In this context, and with a view to facilitate agreement within the Council, the Commission suggested in its Communication the following alternative rates structure:
(1) Minimum standard rate, without any upper limit being set, instead of the previously proposed standard rate band;
(2) One reduced rate set between 4% and 9%, thus retention of the band proposed in 1987; and (3) Maintenance of zero-rating for a limited number of products, instead of the previously proposed abolition of zero-rates.
This alternative rate structure was significantly more moderate and less ambitious than the structure originally proposed by the Commission. However, it was still over-ambitious for Member States, particularly as regards the reduced rates regime -number of reduced rates allowed (only one), percentage band allowed (4% to 9%), list of items to which they would be applicable (six items), and finally the compulsory nature of this list. In an attempt to facilitate agreement regarding the reduced rates regime, the European Parliament suggested that two lists of goods and services would be set up: a first list, covering six items, for which a reduced rate would be mandatory; and a second list, covering twenty-four items, for which a reduced rate would be optional. 25 The first list contained most of the goods and services listed in the Commission's initial proposal, some of which could be traded across frontiers. The second list broadly covered transactions where differences in VAT rates could not distort competition because the products in question were not generally traded between Member States.
In March and June 1991 the Council finally reached agreement on the essential characteristics of the VAT rate structure, which was to apply within the context of the new transitional system. The suggestion was not followed either.
The new VAT rate structure, which would apply from 31 December 1992 onwards, was largely a product of political compromises and a good example of the victory of politics over economic efficiency. The price for reaching agreement was an extremely complex system (mostly if compared with the simplicity of the structure initially proposed by the Commission), filled with exceptions and derogations. Overall, the new rate structure comprised two types of rules: general rules; and temporary measures, which in theory would apply only during the transitional system.
General rules
Under the general rules, Member States must apply a standard rate, which should not be lower than 15%, but no maximum limit was established. This rule followed from the Commission's 1989 suggestion for a minimum standard rate, instead of the band initially proposed. Member States could also apply either one or two reduced rates, which could not be lower than 5%. These rates could be applied to a range of seventeen goods and services listed in what is now Annex III and additionally, under certain conditions, to the supplies of natural gas and electricity. These reduced rates rules were substantially different from the ones originally proposed by the Commission in 1987. 27 The most important difference was the optional nature of the rates: Member
States were no longer obliged to apply a reduced rate to a few items, but were instead not only free to choose whether to apply a reduced rate or not, but also free to choose to which items (from the ones listed) that rate would apply. The other obvious differences were the possibility to apply two reduced rates (instead of one) and the increased list of items which could be subject to reduced rates (eighteen instead of six). Despite these differences, however, the Council did adopt the Commission's approach in relation to the criteria adopted for the choice of items which could be subject to reduced rates: 28 one list of goods and services which were already taxed by a majority of Member States at reduced rates. This approach was substantially different from the one advocated by the Parliament, whose two-list' proposal was based on a distortion of competition criteria.
Finally, it should be noted that, under the new legislation, certain supplies were not subject to these rates' rules, namely works of art, antiques and collector's items, agricultural outputs; and gold.
These supplies would be subject to special arrangements and thus, the object of autonomous Directives to be approved on a future date by the Council. 
Temporary measures
During the transitional period, and until the introduction of a definitive VAT system, Member States were allowed to maintain and/or introduce measures which derogated from the general rates' rules described above. The introduction of these temporary measures had not been envisaged by the Commission's 1987 proposal, nor had it been suggested by the Commission in its 1989 alternative rate structure. Thus, it most probably emerged from the Council's discussions as a method of reiterating the Community's commitment to a simpler, more efficient and harmonised rate structure, but postponing politically difficult decisions for Member States such as the abolition of zero-rating. The implications of these temporary measures to the overall rate structure were immense. 27 As discussed above, insofar as reduced rates are concerned, the Commission's 1989 alternative rate structure did not differ from its original 1987 proposal. Under these temporary measures, Member States were allowed, subject to certain conditions, to:
continue to apply reduced rates lower than the 5% minimum; continue to apply zero-rates; continue to apply both reduced rates lower than the 5% minimum and zero-rates to items not listed in Annex III; continue to apply a reduced rate to restaurant services, children's clothing, children's footwear and housing; and introduce, dependent on certain requirements, an extra reduced rate, not lower than 12%. Additionally, Greece was also allowed to apply, within part of its territory, rates which were 30% lower than the ones applied in the rest of the country; and Ireland could apply for authorisation to apply a reduced rate to the supplies of energy products for heating and lighting. Table 1 provides a comparative overview of the three VAT rate structures discussed above: the structure proposed by the Commission in 1987, the alternative structure suggested by the Commission in 1989 and, finally, the structure which was ultimately approved by the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive. Maintenance of zero-rating
Post-1992 failed initiatives
The VAT transitional system, including the temporary measures on VAT rates described above, was supposed to be in place for a period of four years after 1 January 1993. A time plan was therefore agreed upon according to which the European Commission would bring proposals forward by the end of 1994, with a view to implementing a definitive VAT system based on the origin principle by 1997. Unfortunately, the Commission was unable to fulfil this time plan and it was not until the summer of 1996 that a work programme was presented for the adoption of the definitive VAT system. 30 Although formal legislative proposals were never put forward, the programme contained an outline of the envisaged system, as well as a detailed work plan extending through to mid-1999.
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Amongst the key features of the definitive VAT system, as foreseen under that programme, was the further harmonisation of the main aspects of the VAT system including rates.
This new attempt was too doomed to fail. The first setback came very soon after the presentation of the 1996 programme, as Member States failed to reach total agreement on the already tabled proposal regarding the establishment of a fixed band for standard rates of VAT. This included a minimum rate of 15% and a maximum rate of 25% and whilst Member States were able to agree on the minimum level, it was impossible to reach unanimity on a maximum level. Ultimately, the proposal was approved but the final text contained no reference to the maximum level of standard rate. 32 Thus, very little progress was made on the Commission's proposed 1996 programme and it soon became clear that the degree of harmonisation necessary for the introduction of a definitive VAT system (particularly in terms of VAT rates) would not be achieved.
Further differentiation of rates structures
Since the approval of the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive, VAT rates, far from converging as might have been expected, 33 can diverge much more than under the legal framework set up in 1992. In the meantime, Commission's attempts at limiting overall differentiation failed miserably. In 2003
the Commission presented a proposal with a view to "review and rationalise the use of reduced rates". The proposal left considerably more freedom to Member States to decide on their own VAT rates structure than under previous Commission's proposals, namely the 1987 and 1989 proposals.
Obviously, it considered that by allowing increased freedom, the likelihood of Member States reaching unanimous agreement at the Council would also increase. Although not exceedingly ambitious, however, the proposal did envisage the move to a compulsory natured list of products which may be subject to reduced rates, which seems to have been sufficient to cause concern amongst Member States. 41 After years of discussions at the Council, 42 the proposal was finally approved in 2006 but at significant costs: the emphasis was no longer on rationalisation of reduced rates, but rather on the extension of the temporary rates provisions within the VA Directive, as well as on the extension of the list of products to which reduced rates may apply. the European Parliament and with other stakeholders to obtain all relevant views before initiating a more far reaching proposal on reduced rates is the most effective approach to develop a sustainable and well balanced proposal in the medium term". 45 For those awaiting the presentation of this "far reaching proposal", early signs were not encouraging. As discussed above the European Commission seemed to be moving in the wrong direction: not only had the most recent proposal on VAT rates been aimed at increasing differentiation of rates, rather than the opposite, but equally the consultation paper expressly stated that the Commission was considering introduction of further reduced rates to, amongst others, environmentally friendly products. As will be seen below, this approach changed radically in the wake of the economic and financial crisis.
State-of-Play in 2008
As discussed above, it is clear that although the provisions governing the rates structure have been subject to several amendments since the entering into force of the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive, 46 "the situation has changed little and the level of harmonisation of VAT rates has remained modest". 47 At present the rates structure under the VAT Directive is a multiple-rate system, allowing for a standard rate and one or two reduced rates in theory (two more in practice), and subject to a few basic rules, as follows:
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(1) The standard rate cannot be lower than 15% (Article 97 of the VAT Directive);
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(2) Member States may apply one or two reduced rates to supplies of goods/services specified in The described rules leave Member States significant freedom to establish their own rates structure.
In practice Member States are free to decide on the following: whether to apply one or two reduced rates; whether to apply, subject to special conditions, an extra "parking rate"; the level of standard rate, as long as it is more than 15%; the level of the reduced rate(s), subject to certain conditions, which depend on each Member State's specific circumstances; and to which goods / services to apply reduced rates too, subject to the conditions set out in the VAT Directive. 50 Unsurprisingly, this freedom resulted until recently in VAT rates structures within the EU remaining highly discrepant, highly differentiated, and highly complex. The high level of differentiation is particularly worrying, since in itself will almost always result in high level of discrepancy across Member States, and unavoidably in high level of complexity. however, these comparative advantages of VAT have become particularly significant: on one hand, national governments need additional revenue, and VAT presents itself as a more reliable and stable source of revenue than profits and income, especially in the current climate; on the other hand, the emphasis is also on economic growth as the only medium to long-term solution, with less distortive taxes becoming particularly appealing.
Clearly keen to harness the political momentum, the European Commission presented in December 2010 the Green Paper on the Future of VAT. 57 The stated of the paper, which was said to be "one of the most important documents issued by the European Commission for some time", 58 was to launch a broad based consultation process on the functioning of the current EU VAT system. Indeed, whilst 56 As A. J. Easson prophetically pointed out in 1993, "the fiscal implications of EMU are obvious and considerable. Of the three main instruments of economic policy, Member States will soon relinquish all control over exchange rate policy and will gradually, over the next five years or so, lose much of their control over monetary policy. They will thus be left with fiscal policy alone", see Taxation the paper itself was hardly as ambitious as that aim might suggest, it was nevertheless far-reaching, covering many-albeit not all-of the most problematic areas of the system, including harmonisation of rates. A year later, amidst favourable reactions from other European institutions and various stakeholders, 59 the Commission issued a follow-up Communication, which had two stated purposes: in the long term, to set out the fundamental features of a future EU VAT system-a system which continues to raise revenue but which also increases competitiveness; and in the short to medium term, to list the priority areas for further action in the coming years-with a view to moving towards those objectives. 60 Amongst these listed priority areas was the review of the rate structure.
In the Communication the Commission states that in order to increase the efficiency of the VAT system, it favours restricted use of reduced VAT rates. The use of reduced rates should then be based upon a few guiding principles:
(1) Abolition of those reduced rates which constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market;
(2) Abolition of reduced rates on goods and services for which the consumption is discouraged by other EU policies;
(3) Similar goods and services should be subject to the same VAT rate.
The Commission set out the aim of launching in 2012 an assessment of the current VAT rates structure in the light of these guiding principles, and subsequently make proposals along those lines after ample consultation with stakeholders and Member States by the end of 2013. 61 In this context it launched a public consultation in October 2012 on the review of the EU legislation on VAT reduced rates. 62 As opposed to previous initiatives which were broad in their scope, this was a very targeted public consultation: only nine questions, strictly framed by the guiding principles, eight of which concerned specific sectors of activity, namely the application of reduced rates of VAT to water, 59 See European Commission, energy, waste and e-books. Despite the limited scope of the questions asked, the Commission also asked more generally for any "concrete examples of distortions of competition within the internal market or of specific problems encountered due to the current VAT rules". Despite this effective broadening of the scope of the consultation, the targeted nature of the questions resulted in a low number of submissions from academics, tax advisors and tax practitioners; and on the contrary, a very high number -more than half of all submissions -from national or European associations, the large majority of them representing sectors currently benefiting from a reduced VAT rate.
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Unsurprisingly, the nature of the respondents reflected heavily on the contents of the responses:
most were opposed to the abolition of the reduced rates and/or advocating for their extension; and many challenged the general trend of shifting taxation away from labour towards consumption.
Some submissions also defended that no further harmonisation should take place, and that the decision on whether or not to apply reduced VAT rates should be left to the Member States.
In the context of the outcome of this public consultation, it is pertinent to question whether this latest initiative can be successful. Reviewing the rate structure has been part of every Commission's attempt to reform the EU VAT system-and with good reason. A recent study commissioned by the
EU Commission indicates that a 50% reduction in the dissimilarity in VAT rates structures between
Member States could result in a rise of 9.8% in intra-EU trade and an increase in real GDP of 1.1%. it has failed to rally the troops. The approach now adopted by the European Commission is very different: there are comparatively few references to the EU perspective, and indeed there is only one reference in the entire Green Paper on the Future of VAT to the "Internal Market"; instead the focus is clearly on "consolidation of public finances" and "sustainable economic growth". In the midst of the economic and financial crisis, the Commission has clearly re-packaged long-sought reform by offering Member States EU answers to national needs-and that is why this time, it might just succeed. 66 Furthermore it must also be acknowledged that the limited, or specific, nature of the review now being considered may make it politically easier to attain Member States' agreement on.
This limited nature of the review, however, also raises concerns namely on whether, even if successful, is this proposed review worthwhile? Certainly it would result in an improvement to the current EU VAT rate structure, but not a massive one. Essentially there is a trade of: lower risks, lower returns; such are the costs of political realism.
European VAT Rate Structures: Criteria for Reform
Whether the latest European Commission's initiative on the review of the EU VAT rate structure gathers the necessary support or not, it is clear that only limited improvements to the structure can be achieved. Therefore, if significant gains are to be achieved, they must come through a different route; and if the political momentum is to be seized, it is necessary to think outside the box. In this context, would it be possible to have significantly improved, converging, European VAT rate structures, through national, uncoordinated, action?
Ideal VAT rate structure
As discussed above, the original introduction of reduced VAT rates was based not so much on clearly articulated policy objectives but rather on pragmatic political goals, as designers of the VAT sought to replicate the impact of the predecessor turnover taxes and deflect concerns about the tax on beneficiaries of previous concessions. Over time, however, it was argued that the use of reduced rates achieves social and distributional aims, and namely three ex post facto rationales have been offered, as follows:
(1) Vertical equity: idea that these concessions limit the natural regressivity of VAT, i.e. that the tax weights more heavily on poorer households; so applying reduced rates to key products such as food, energy, healthcare, education, etc, would limit the impact of this tax on those households.
(2) Positive externalities: idea that these concessions increased consumption of so-called merit goods, such as cultural events, books, sport activities, etc.
(3) Increase employment: idea that application of reduced rates will ultimately lead to increase employment in labour-intensive industries (e.g. hairdressing), or areas where price is particularly elastic (e.g. electronics), or both (e.g. restaurants).
Once it is accepted that the application of reduced rates amounts to tax expenditures, these should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis similarly to direct expenditure programs: what are the benefits of applying reduced VAT rates? I.e. does application of these rates actually achieve social and distributional aims? And even if it does, what are the collateral costs, from both a legal and an economic perspective?
What are the benefits of applying reduced VAT rates?
The equity argument derives from the fact that the proportion of income that is saved reduces as income reduces, with the lowest income earners using all their income for consumption and diverting none to savings. As VAT falls only on income used for consumption and exempts income that is applied to savings, the tax is said to fall more heavily on lower income persons than on higher income persons in terms of the proportion of income derived by those persons. 67 Reduced rates for commodities that form a higher percentage of the spending budget of lower income persons are seen as a way of reducing the tax burden on these persons, and thus increasing their consumption capability.
The positive externalities rationale for exemptions derives from a belief that the market price for some types of supplies does not fully reflect the overall benefits from consumption of those supplies for society as a whole, and thus government intervention to subsidise consumption of those goods is deemed desirable.
The job creation argument has been developed relatively recently, when compared with the other two rationales for the use of reduced VAT rates. It derives from the belief that price decreases resulting from the introduction of reduced rates will lead to increase in demand, which in turn will result in increased supply. In labour-intensive services that increased supply will necessarily lead to new job creation. This argument attained political endorsement within the EU in the late nineties, leading to the approval of the so-called labour-intensive services experiment in 1999. explanation has yet to be given. A study published in 2008 has suggested that the empirical results of the labour-intensive services experiment might be due to its temporary nature, i.e. if firms know that a lower VAT rate is temporary, why would they use time and money to expand production capacity and incur costs if they have to revert to their previous production level within a few years.
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It is also possible that, labour-intensive services do not operate in fully competitive markets, 70 and that a decrease of 1% in the rate of VAT is too minimal to be passed on. Finally, it is also worth noting that both experiments took place in a boom economy, where it is possible that demand outweighed supply. Yet, these are merely tentative explanations: in practice, until definite arguments are presented all that can be said with certainty is that evidence so far does not support the argument that reduced VAT rates reduce prices.
The recent changes to VAT rate structures, which took place in various Member States in the context of the current economic crisis, will offer new opportunities for assessing the incidence of VAT, and 68 See SEC (2003) Studies, the decrease in prices for restaurant services was not minimal -around 1% -but also temporary. According to the French authorities, if only 30% of the VAT cut had been passed on to customer, this would create 6,000 jobs in the long run, but the government stood to lose up to €3 billion in revenue in a full fiscal year from the cut; this would equate to each new job in the sector costing French taxpayers €500,000. In 2010 Germany reduced the VAT rate applicable to the hotel industry as part of a more general tax cut. A recent survey indicated that the cut had not been passed on to consumers, and instead prices had remained the same.
If reduced VAT rates cannot reduce prices, then the logical conclusion is that they cannot attain the distributional and social aims that they are set up to achieve. However, even if one assumes that the above empirical results are flawed, and that indeed reduced rates of VAT do affect prices, there are still no certainties that distributional and social aims are, or can be, reached. A recent empirical study seems to indicate that the effectiveness of applying such rates depends on the elasticity of specific products: in the case of basic goods, such as food, consumers react only weakly to lower prices (where consumption is price in-elastic), so production and employment will not increase significantly; in contrast, if consumers react strongly to new prices, as in the case for high value goods, such as package holidays, books, and electronic equipment (where consumption is price elastic), production and employment may increase significantly. households. 75 High-income households typically consume more of basic necessities than low-income households. In this context, if items currently subject to reduced rates were fully taxed -personal income tax relief or means-tested social security benefits -the government could more effectively achieve social and distributional aims, and have additional revenue left over to apply to other redistributive programs. 76 In this sense, lower income persons may be much worse off with a tax system that contains reduced VAT rates designed to assist them, than they would be in a tax system with one single rate and redistribution of the excess revenue raised under a more neutral tax base.
In addition, job creation or protection of key sectors of the economy, would also be better achieved through direct subsidies.
What are the costs of applying reduced VAT rates?
The benefits of applying reduced VAT rates are therefore questionable. Moreover, the costs of subsidising consumption of target goods and services in this manner are on the contrary likely to be significant. From a legal perspective application of reduced rates gives rise to definitional and interpretative problems, and constitute an incentive to engage in aggressive tax planning. For these reasons reduced rates tend to result in substantial -and increasing -litigation, which in turn results in substantial compliance and administrative costs. 77 Symptomatic of this increase in litigation is the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to the application of reduced rates by Member States to various goods and services. 78 At stake in many of these cases was the application of reduced rates to specific products, whilst other similar products were subject to standard rates. The Court has consistently emphasised the importance of respecting the principle of fiscal neutrality: the application of reduced rates to certain products must be consistent with this principle that precludes treating similar goods, which are therefore in direct competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes. In a recent case concerning exemptions the Court has gone further in application of the principle of fiscal neutrality by stating that Member States cannot apply different VAT treatments to services that are comparable to each other from the point of view of the customer or meet the same needs of the customer. 79 Following this decision the debate has been on whether the new criteria will have implications for the Court approach to VAT rates structures. Some have already been defending that it will, stating that it is "highly likely" that the criteria laid down in Rank Group will affect the application of VAT rates, particularly to food. 80 The big test should come soon with the eagerly expected decisions in the e-books cases, where the Court has been called to decide on whether e-books can be subject to reduced rates of VAT similarly to hardcopy books. into account". 85 The Court concluded that it is for the UK House of Lords to determine whether the appraisal made by HMRC fulfils these conditions. The outcome of the case thus became dependent on the incidence of the tax, which is notoriously difficult to establish.
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Pringles concerned the classification of their popular snack for VAT purposes. In the UK food is usually zero rated, however potato crisps are specifically excluded from this rule, and are thus subject to standard rate (17.5%). The rationale for this distinction is, as before, unclear but in this case seems to have been health considerations which guided the legislator, although the first instance judge in this case, John Avery-Jones, has recently stated that the had been unable to establish any purpose for this rule. Following a dispute between Procter & Gamble (P&G), Pringles' manufacturer and HMRC, the case was sent to the VAT and Duties Tribunal, which concluded in 2006
that Pringles must be regarded as "a potato crisp product", and thus subject to the standard 17.5%
rate. P&G appealed, insisting that their product was not similar to potato crisps, because of their "mouth melt" taste, "uniform colour" and "regular shape", which are not found in nature. In its decision dated July 2008, the High Court upheld the appeal. The Court considered that Pringles should not be regarded as potato crisps. In order to be classified as such, a product "must be wholly, or substantially wholly, made from the potato", whilst Pringles are made from potato flour, corn flour, wheat starch and rice flour together with fat and emulsifier, salt and seasoning, with a potato content of only 42%.
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In addition to highlighting definitional and interpretative difficulties, these rulings also demonstrate the pitfalls of attempting to attain distributional and social aims through reduced rates: biscuits and potato crisps were excluded from the scope of application of the reduced rates because the legislator deemed these products as not fulfilling those distributional and social aims; yet, similar products like M&S teacakes, or Pringles are benefiting from reduced rates; the result being that the tax system is de facto subsidising those products, in detriment of competing products. The consequences for fiscal neutrality are obvious: treating competing products differently for VAT purposes is bound to create distortions of competition. In addition there might be unexpected detrimental effects: the ruling in Pringles, for example, creates an incentive for producers of potato crisps to reduce the potato contents in their products in order to benefit from a reduced rate.
Whilst difficult to quantify, the costs of these distortions of consumption and investment decisions may be extremely significant. Reduced rates of VAT erode the tax base, and importantly may subsidise inefficient production -since the suppliers of products subject to reduced rates do not have to compete on a level playing field with suppliers of products subject to standard. The result is a significant decrease in efficiency of the tax, as measured by the IMF and the OECD, which shows that European countries' VAT systems tend to rank below the OECD c-efficiency ratio, or revenue ration, average, which stands at 55 points out of 100 possible -suggesting that about half of the potential VAT revenue is not collected by Member States. 88 The results of the cost-benefit analysis as applied to reduced VAT rates is therefore particularly negative: not only it is unclear whether they accomplish any of the social and distributional objectives that they set out to achieve, but they also carry significant costs beyond the mere loss of potential revenue. 89 The ideal VAT is therefore a broad-based VAT, with a single rate. This much has been consistently defended by the OECD since the 1980s, 90 and was recently supported by the European Commission in the 2010 Green Paper on the Future of VAT. This has also been the position of the IMF, which has recommended the introduction of a single-rate VAT system to many countries around the world. 91 Such a VAT rate structure, however, would be extremely difficult -if not impossible -to implement in Europe; so the question is, what is an achievable VAT rate structure.
Achievable VAT rate structure
In light of the above, any reform of national VAT rate structures with a view to having a significantly improved structure, must take in consideration various factors. First, it must be acknowledged that, in the immediate term, moving products from reduced to standard rate is likely to have a significant economic impact, namely in the context of the high standard rates applied in almost all Member
States that mean that this move could represent as much as a 20% or 15% tax hike. This economic impact could be reflected in higher prices, which would hit the poorest households the hardest, or in increased unemployment: one can imagine that in price inelastic sectors, such as food or utilities, prices will most likely increase; 92 in other price elastic sectors, where an increase in price might lead to a considerable contraction in consumption, suppliers may opt to maintain prices, but will need instead to decrease costs, which in a labour-intensive sector, such as restaurant services or tourism, will lead to job loses.
Secondly, it must be accepted that in the current financial environment that most European countries find themselves in -and not just the ones which benefited from a bail-out agreement -in the context of problematic budget deficits, and significant financial restrains, the likelihood of introduction of measures at personal income tax or social security level, to compensate the VAT hike, is small at best. This concern was indeed expressed by several respondents to the European Commission's latest public consultation on review of reduced rates: in the current economic climate respondents expressed fear that there might be no national compensating measures, or that they would be insufficient.
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Finally, any reform of nationals VAT rate structures must take into consideration EU law limitations.
As opposed to exemptions, application of reduced rates under the VAT Directive is non-compulsory, i.e. the Directive establishes maximum standards of differentiation -number of rates, number of products to which reduced rates can be applied -but does not establish a minimum level of differentiation; Member States are free to apply reduced rates to as limited number of products as they wish, and ad extremis are even free to apply only one rate. Therefore extension of the VAT base through elimination of reduced rates is not subject to any EU law limitations. However, the implementation of compensatory measures may be; in particular, the freedom to introduce measures to compensate labour-intensive or key economic sectors for the increase in VAT rates in might be severely reduced. Within the EU, national subsidies to specific industries, either in the form of tax relief / incentives or direct subsidies, are limited by state aid law. these products has an aspirational value. Even if that is the case, is it legitimate to ask low-income households to subsidise attendance to theatre plays, or the opera, by high-income households?
Third, these products are by nature price elastic, so it is unclear to what extent prices will be affected by a VAT rate increase. It is possible that they will be an effect on employment, in the context of a possible need to decrease costs, but it is worth keeping in mind that these are not usually labour-intensive industries for unqualified workers, but quite the opposite: they tend to employ small number of qualified workers. Finally, in the context of the current financial and economic crisis, encouraging the consumption of products which hold positive externalities is hardly a priority! Criterion 2: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of VAT where the rationale for is application is vertical equity. The basis for this criterion is the low price elasticity of these products; prices will most likely increase, hitting low-income households hardest. However, given that high-income households consume considerably more of these products, it makes sense to limit the application of reduce rates to those categories of goods and services which are truly essential, such as food.
Criterion 3: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of VAT where its elimination would have a serious impact on industries which are either labour-intensive or key for economic recovery.
The arguments in favour of maintaining reduced rates for these sectors are based on keeping competitiveness of national products in the international market, and employment concerns. In principle the tax hike could be absorbed by suppliers by decrease in their margins, but considering the size of the hike it is likely that at least part of the increase will have to be passed on to consumers in higher prices, or to employees in lower salaries / job losses. Both options carry economic risks for key sectors of the economy and those which are labour-intensive: if passed on in higher prices there is a risk of decrease competitiveness for exporting sectors of the economy, which in labour-intensive sectors can have the added effect of raising unemployment; even for nonexporting sectors, if price elastic, it is more likely that the VAT hike would be passed on employees, as increase in prices would lead to contraction in consumption, and then again there would be a significant risk of job losses.
Criterion 4: Rationalisation of categories of goods and services to which reduced rates of VAT apply, by eliminating distinctions within categories, and limiting the use of different rates to different products within the same category. Distinctions within categories are the main sources of interpretative and definitional difficulties; elimination of these distinctions would therefore lead to higher legal certainty, be a disincentive to planning, abuse and fraud, and decrease significantly the potential for litigation -all of which would in turn result in lower compliance and administrative costs. Elimination of distinctions would also avoid other economic distortions, such as product manipulation so as to avail of the reduce VAT rate.
The proposed criteria were used as a basis for the Portuguese VAT rate structure reform in 2012.
Under the bail-out agreement signed with the EU and the IMF in 2011, Portugal was required to reform its VAT, which was deemed to be highly inefficient and if reformed offered potential to help the Portuguese Government reduce its budget deficit. The required reform, based on the above criteria, was implemented in the 2012 State Budget, and it resulted in the following key changes to the existing rate structure:
(1) Cultural events, sports activities and environmentally friendly products were moved from the reduced and intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of criterion 1).
(2) Non-essential food and beverages, take-away and restaurant services were moved from the reduced and intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of criterion 2). (4) Distinctions within categories of foodstuff have been eliminated, so that specific categories are either subject to reduced or to standard rates (on the basis of criterion 4).
The reform resulted in a 30 points reduction in tax expenditure, as well as a significant increase in the C-efficiency level, which before the reform stood at 44 points. 95 Consumption has contracted significantly; however, until reliable price data is available, it is difficult to dissociate the extent to which the contraction resulted from the VAT base broadening, from the contraction that it would have happen as a result of the economic and financial crisis regardless of any tax hikes.
Consequently VAT revenue has increased, but at lower levels than expected.
Despite the somewhat disappointing short-term results in terms of revenue collected, the Portuguese reform of the VAT rate structure was broadly complimented by the EU and the IMF. The IMF Country Report on Portugal at the time of the reforms stated that as a result of these the VAT tax base levied at the standard rates was enlarged from 60 to 80% of the total base, which would generate savings of about 1.2% of GDP. 96 The report from the European Commission referred to additional revenues of 1.4% of GDP, stating:
"Following past increases in the VAT rates, the 2012 budget focused mostly on broadening the tax base […] In order to protect vulnerable groups, many essential goods remain subject to the 95 Although it has been recently suggested that an imperfect extension of the VAT base to cover more but not all services, might be welfare inferior to the baseline, see B. Bye, B. Strom and T. Avitsland, "Welfare effects of VAT reforms: a general equilibrium analysis" (2012) International Tax and Public Finance 19, 368-392. 96 See "Taxing Matters", Society Now, Spring 2013, 25.
